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INTRODUCTION
The situation on the financial markets continues to be affected by the unfolding sovereign 
debt crisis, and by the weak economic growth outlook in the short term. From May to end-
July 2012, financial tensions in the euro area heightened, affecting Spain and Italy with 
particular intensity. These developments resulted in a worsening of public- and private-
sector financing conditions. The rising tensions were prompted by several factors, 
including most notably the political uncertainty in Greece. Meantime, for Spain, the adverse 
international setting was compounded by the negative course of the real economy, the 
situation of public finances and doubts over the quality of bank balance sheets.
Since late July, the tensions on European financial markets have eased somewhat. 
Fundamentally contributing to this was the statement by President Draghi on 26 July that the 
ECB was prepared to do whatever was necessary to safeguard the euro, and the subsequent 
announcement on 2 August by the ECB Governing Council to adopt a programme for 
unlimited purchases of public debt on the  secondary markets, the main details of which 
were communicated following its September meeting.  These operations will be subject to 
strict and effective conditionality established under a full macroeconomic adjustment 
programme or under a precautionary programme of the European Financial Stability Facility 
or of the European Stability Mechanism, provided they include the possibility of these 
institutions making purchases on the primary market. From a more structural perspective, 
headway is being made towards the creation of a single banking supervisor in the euro area, 
in connection with which the European Commission unveiled a legislative proposal on 12 
September. Despite this improvement in financial conditions, full normality has not been 
restored to the market situation (as illustrated, for example, by the fact that the Spanish 
economy’s risk premium, despite falling, remains high), and uncertainty is still high.
In Spain, the focus of the economic policy measures pursued in recent months has been 
on the budgetary area. First, the Organic Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial 
Sustainability was approved in late April 2012, intending to strengthen the budgetary 
discipline framework by setting structural balanced-budget targets for all tiers of 
government, ceilings on public debt, transparency requirements and mechanisms for the 
correction of slippage, which include penalties or, indeed, government intervention in 
certain circumstances. Further, a fresh package of adjustment measures was approved in 
July. Their aim was to comply with the commitments entered into at the European level, 
including most notably a significant rise in indirect taxation and a reduction in public-
sector wages. Late September saw the unveiling of the draft State budget for 2013; this 
includes new consolidation measures, and a structural reforms programme incorporating 
an explicit schedule of measures for the coming months in the budgetary realm and in the 
products and services markets, geared to liberalising certain sectors and to promoting 
competitiveness.
Turning to banking, in order to strengthen confidence about the valuation of assets related 
to the real estate development sector, which is undergoing a strong adjustment, Royal 
Decree-Laws (RDLs) 2/2012 and 18/2012 were approved, which most notably raise 
provisioning requirements for bank exposures to this sector.
Last May the Government decided to conduct a top-down stress test of the Spanish 
banking system. The aim was to have an independent evaluation of the resilience of the 
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sector as a whole to a very adverse and thus less likely future macroeconomic scenario. 
Once the top-down exercise was concluded, and as a natural extension to it, a bank-by-
bank bottom-up stress test was performed so as to have a likewise independent and 
external evaluation of the capital requirements of each bank under the aforementioned 
adverse scenario. 
In parallel with the bank-by-bank stress test, the Government requested external financial 
assistance in the context of the recapitalisation and restructuring of the Spanish banking 
sector. This financial assistance, laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
between the Spanish and European authorities, took the specific form of an amount of up 
to €100 billion, aimed at reinforcing the solvency of banks with a capital shortfall.
The results of the stress tests performed on Spain’s fourteen biggest banking groups 
accounting for around 90% of the system’s assets show that, under the adverse scenario, 
seven banks do not have additional capital needs. For the other half (accounting for 38% 
of the credit portfolio), additional capital needs of €59.3 billion have been identified, without 
considering either the integration processes under way or the tax effects.
The banking sector has thus been pursuing its business in a setting marked by the 
tensions on international financial markets, the weakness of the real economy and its 
own restructuring and recapitalisation process. In these circumstances, credit to the 
resident private sector continued to fall in the first half of the year. Adding to banks’ 
greater difficulties in obtaining funds on wholesale markets is the lower credit quality of 
borrowers, which hampers their access to credit, and also lower demand by households 
and firms for funds, as a result of the economy’s cyclical position. In any event, the 
downtrend in credit is consistent with a necessary process of deleveraging of the Spanish 
economy, following years of continuous expansion in which excessive debt built up. That 
should not, however, lead to any check on credit to the sectors that are most dynamic 
and which most boost economic activity, such as the export sector and new business 
start-ups. 
Running concurrently with the ongoing contraction in private debt is a notable increase in 
public-sector liabilities, chiefly as a result of the build-up of budget deficits. A tempered 
increase in these liabilities in the short term and their reduction over the medium and long 
term will be key to restoring the confidence of the financial markets. And such confidence 
is a necessary condition for the full normalisation of the financing conditions to which the 
resident private sectors will be subject.
The increase in doubtful assets has persisted, especially those related to the construction 
and real estate development sector. Here, the increase and levels have been significantly 
higher than in the other credit segments. Among the latter,  lending to households for 
house purchases continues to show a low doubtful assets ratio. This is due to various 
factors, including most notably: the traditional business model pursued by banks; the 
regulations in force in Spain, which makes borrowers liable for all their assets in the event 
of the risk of default; socio-economic factors, such as family support to the debtors; and, 
in particular, the low interest rates prevailing for loans currently outstanding, as these were 
entered into with lower spreads than those applied to new loans. 
Banks continue to have difficulty gaining access to wholesale funding markets, which are 
affected by the tension arising from the sovereign debt crisis. But banks have continued to 
take advantage of the windows of opportunity that have opened, as was the case in 
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September. In any event, wholesale market access dysfunctions have translated into an 
increase in the recourse to Eurosystem financing, which, following the peaks reached in 
the summer, has fallen slightly over the recent period.
Retail deposits have continued to fall, at a moderate rate, in 2012 to date, furthering a 
pattern dating back to mid-2011. This behaviour is in response both to the lesser capacity 
of households and firms to accumulate financial assets, in a setting of weak income growth 
and of deleveraging, and to something of a shift in these agents’ portfolios from deposits 
to other assets and, in particular, to bank securities issued by banks themselves 
(commercial paper). In this latter instance, this does not entail a loss of retail funds for 
banks, since they are replacing certain instruments with others under their liabilities. 
Bearing in mind this effect, the gap between credit and retail liabilities vis-à-vis the non-
financial private sector has narrowed over recent months at a similar pace to that observed 
on average since early 2010.
There has been strong downward pressure on the profitability of deposit institutions, 
entailing losses at the aggregate level. The increase in the net interest margin has not 
sufficed to offset higher asset impairment losses. The strong growth of these corrections 
in value is due, on one hand, to the weakness of the economic situation, but also, and 
notably, to the bringing forward of the write-offs required under RDLs 2/2012 and 18/2012.
In any event, the Spanish banking sector is currently undergoing a reform comprising the 
recapitalisation and restructuring of the most vulnerable banks, and the adjustment of its 
aggregate capacity. The publication of the bank-by-bank stress test results on 28 
September show that the core of the sector is sufficiently capitalised and that the additional 
capital needs under the adverse scenario are substantially lower than the maximum 
volume of the financing facility agreed with the European authorities. The banks requiring 
public aid will undergo restructuring forthwith to ensure the appropriate use of public funds 
and the proper functioning of the market for banking services. 
This progress in the banking arena, which should shore up the solvency and profitability of 
the sector as a whole, will foreseeably contribute to strengthening financial market 
confidence. Such confidence is needed to restore normality to financing conditions for the 
different economic sectors. In this connection, it is also key to persevere with economic 
policies, including structural reforms and budgetary measures, geared to attaining this 
objective.
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1 MACROECONOMIC RISKS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
Since the publication of the previous Financial Stability Report, international financial 
markets have continued to be influenced by the unfolding of the euro area sovereign debt 
crisis. During this period other risks considered less imminent also gained in prominence, 
such as the fiscal situation in the United States and in Japan or the greater vulnerability of 
certain emerging countries to a lower-than-expected rate of activity.
From May to late July, financial tensions in the euro area heightened. This affected Spain 
and Italy with particular intensity and made for a tightening of financing conditions both for 
the public and private sectors in these countries. The yield spread on 10-year Spanish 
public debt over the 10-year German Bund exceeded 630 bp in late July, the highest 
recorded value since the inception of the euro area (see Chart 1.1), while stock market 
indices fell. These developments were accompanied by downgrades to public and private 
debt in Spain (and, in particular, to that of credit institutions). This climate prompted a fresh 
increase in the demand for safe-haven assets, such as the public debt of the economies 
with top credit ratings, which is reflected in declines in yields. Various factors contributed 
to the worsening of the tensions, including most notably the political uncertainty in Greece 
and, in relation to Spain, investor concern over public finances and the situation of the 
financial system. Against this background, the Spanish government requested financial 
assistance from the European institutions in June in order to recapitalise its weakest 
banks. Following this request, the Eurogroup agreed to grant funds for an amount of up 
to €100 billion. In parallel, there was a decline in policy interest rates in the euro area 
during this period, with the rate on the main refinancing operations falling by 25 bp in July 
to 0.75%.
The tensions on euro area financial markets have abated somewhat since late July. The 
sovereign debt spreads of the countries subject to the greatest financial tensions narrowed 
from their peaks in July, standing in the case of the Spanish 10-year bond at around 415 bp 
as at the cut-off date of this report. In parallel, the main international stock market indices 
posted gains, more markedly so in the case of the Spanish market, and the euro appreciated 
to some extent. Private-sector access to wholesale funding also improved, as reflected in 
the volume of issues launched in September both by Spanish credit institutions and non-
financial corporations. The decision adopted by the ECB in September, further to its 
August Governing Council meeting relating to the adoption of a secondary market 
sovereign bond purchase programme [Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs)], has 
played a significant role when it comes to explaining this improvement. The purchases, 
which will be subject to strict and effective conditionality established under a European 
Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism programme, may encompass 
public debt securities with a residual maturity of up to three years. Measures by non-euro 
area central banks, via new non-conventional measures, in response to the slowdown in 
activity in their respective economies, have also contributed to stabilising international 
financial markets.
During this period there was a progressive slowdown in activity in the emerging economies, 
and in some cases - most notably in Brazil and China - it was sharper than expected. 
These developments were in response to the lesser contribution of external demand and, 
in some cases, to the weakening in domestic demand. The worsening of the euro area 
crisis influenced the emerging economies through the trade channel and was more marked 
International financial markets 
continued to be affected 
mainly by sovereign debt crisis 
developments in the euro area
The tensions on European 
financial markets heightened 
from May to July, affecting 
Spain and Italy with particular 
intensity
Since the end of July tensions 
have eased somewhat, and 
the resident sectors’ access to 
wholesale funding has 
improved. Contributing 
particularly to this was the 
ECB’s announcement of its 
Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMTs) 
programme
Economic activity in the 
emerging economies 
continued to gradually slow…
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in the emerging European economies and in China. Generally, inflation tended to ease, 
although the increase in energy and in some food prices in Q3 prompted something of a 
rebound. Against this background, some central banks continued with the cycle of interest 
rate cuts, although such conduct was far from generalised.
In the developed economies, following a rebound in activity in 2012 Q1, an across-the-
board slowdown was seen in Q2 and in Q3. Outside the euro area, the loss of dynamism 
was more acute in certain economies such as Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, where the labour market showed fresh signs of weakness; however, a slight 
improvement was recorded in the United States in Q3. In this setting, and with inflation 
rates tending to ease, there was a further expansionary turn in the monetary policies of 
these countries using non-conventional measures.
After stagnating in the first three months of 2012, euro area GDP fell by 0.2% in quarter-
on-quarter terms in Q2, translating into a year-on-year decline of 0.5% (see Chart 1.2.A). 
Short- and medium-term growth prospects have also worsened somewhat, as reflected in 
the Eurosystem’s September projection exercise results, which point to a change in GDP 
of between -0.6% and -0.2% in 2012, and of between -0.4% and 1.4% in 2013, rates that 
are below those in the June exercise.
… and in the developed 
economies, activity slowed 
once more
In the euro area, GDP fell 
slightly in 2012 Q2, and short- 
and medium-term growth 
prospects were revised 
downwards
SOURCE: Datastream, Reuters and Bloomberg.
a Euro area: 5-year iTraxx Europe Senior Financials. United States and United Kingdom: average 5-year CDS for commercial banks.
Latest data: 26 October 2012.
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There was a quarter-on-quarter decline of 0.4% in Spanish GDP in Q2, compared with the 
0.3% fall in the previous quarter, and the year-on-year rate was -1.3% against -0.6% in 
March (see Chart 1.2.A). This fall was accompanied by a step-up in the pace of job 
destruction which, on EPA (Labour Force Survey) figures, rose to a year-on-year rate of 
4.8% in this same period, and the unemployment rate climbed to 24.6% (see Chart 1.2.B). 
In Q3, output has continued falling at a significant pace while employment has continued 
to shrink, with the unemployment rate reaching 25%.
Household and corporate debt has continued to fall and, despite the contraction in 
household income and the moderate increase in corporate income reflected in the 
National Accounts, this has allowed the ongoing deleveraging in both sectors to continue. 
Households and firms remain, however, subject to a high degree of financial pressure, as 
reflected in the high doubtful assets ratio. In the case of households, the difficulties 
arising from the high unemployment rate have been exacerbated by the decline in their 
net wealth, itself the result essentially of the fall in real estate prices, which has stepped 
up in recent months. The information available on business profits in the first half of 2012, 
based on the quarterly sample of corporations reporting to the Central Balance Sheet 
Data Office, shows a considerable contraction in these corporations’ profits and 
profitability ratios in this period.
Net general government borrowing remains at high levels; accordingly, the growth rate of 
the sector’s debt remains high (14.8% in annual terms, in August), far outpacing GDP 
growth, which has led to further increases in the debt ratio (76% of GDP in Q2) and in the 
associated debt burden (2.8% of GDP). In light of the official budget deficit forecasts for 
2012 (7.3% of GDP) and 2013 (4.5% of GDP), the foreseeable weak economic growth and 
the potential impact of the aid to the financial sector, the public debt ratio might stand at 
over 90% of GDP at the close of 2013.
In sum, although the measures recently adopted by the European Central Bank and, 
specifically, the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions programme, have 
helped lessen tensions on euro area financial markets and contain liquidity risks, a high 
degree of uncertainty persists. Moreover, the risks linked to economic weakness remain 
in place.
In Spain the decline in GDP in 
Q2 was slightly higher than 
that in Q1, and job destruction 
intensified
The non-financial private 
sector remains subject to 
substantial financial pressure, 
and it has continued reducing 
its high debt…
… while the general 
government debt and debt 
burden continue to grow in 
terms of GDP
Despite the easing of financial 
tensions, uncertainty remains 
high and the risks linked to the 
sluggishness of economic 
growth persist
SOURCES: INE, Eurostat and Banco de España.
a Quarter-on-quarter rates.
b Year-on-year rates.
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2  DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS
Since last May there has been a deterioration in the macro-financial conditions in Spain, 
where the tensions deriving from the sovereign debt crisis remain present. The Spanish 
banking sector has been subject to these general uncertainties, while doubts have 
persisted over the quality of their balance sheets.
In June, and in parallel with the second phase of estimation of capital needs (the bottom-
up exercise), the Government submitted a formal request for financial assistance to the 
Eurogroup within the context of the recapitalisation and restructuring of the banking sector, 
leading to the extension of a credit line of up to €100 billion and the signing of a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The MoU lays down specific conditions for 
institutions that need public aid, and others to improve the sector’s supervision and 
regulation. Chapter 3 of this FSR analyses in detail the progress made in complying with 
the MoU and the next steps to take.
The tensions afflicting the euro area, most intensely so Spain and Italy, also led to actions 
by the European authorities that have contributed to their alleviation since the end of July. 
The ECB agreed the OMT, an unlimited programme of secondary-market government debt 
purchases (see Box 2.1). From a more structural perspective, progress has been made 
towards the creation of a single euro area banking supervisor by means of a proposal for 
legislation of the European Commission of 12 September. Despite these positive 
developments, tensions persist in the euro area, and the wholesale funding markets are 
dysfunctional, reflecting the macro-financial risks mentioned above.
The consolidated balance sheet of Spanish deposit institutions, which includes both 
activity in Spain and that carried out through their subsidiaries abroad, grew in June 2012 
at a year-on-year rate of 5.2% (see Table 2.1).
This increase in the overall balance sheet has been consistent with an ongoing contraction 
in financing (credit and fixed income) to the private sector, which fell in June 2012 by 0.3%, 
relative to the same month of the previous year (see the memorandum item in Table 2.1). 
This contraction has been concentrated in business in Spain, in line, as analysed in greater 
detail below, with the weakness of economic activity.
Financing to general government has been moving in the other direction, posting a year-
on-year increase of 16.1% (see the memorandum item in Table 2.1), which took its weight 
in the consolidated balance sheet to 11.7% in June 2012 (10.6% in June 2011). The 
growth of financing to general government was entirely concentrated in business in 
Spain, since the year-on-year rate of change of this variable in foreign business was 
negative in June 2012.
The deterioration in credit quality is apparent in the increase in doubtful assets which, at 
the consolidated balance sheet level (business in Spain and foreign business), increased 
by 34.5% in June 2012, relative to June 2011. This, along with the contraction in credit, led 
to a further rise in the doubtful assets ratio of consolidated balance sheets, to 6% in June 
2012 (up from 4.6% in June 2011, see memorandum item in Table 2.1). This upward trend 
in the doubtful assets ratio is concentrated in business in Spain, a phenomenon that is 
analysed in greater detail below.
2.1  Banking risks
Since May Spain’s 
macro-financial conditions 
have worsened, with doubts 
persisting over the banking 
sector
The announcement 
of the OMT programme 
by the ECB helped to relieve 
the countries under most 
pressure, although tensions 
persist on the financial 
markets
Financing to the private 
sector has contracted
Financing to general 
government grew 
in business in Spain
Doubtful assets continued 
to rise, leading to a higher 
doubtful assets ratio
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As in previous quarters, a notable increase is observed in derivatives, on both sides of the 
balance sheet, so that the net position is small. This trend is largely explained by the behaviour 
of interest rates and is related to hedging. Equity instruments, in line with the current 
financial market context, decreased by 34.4% in June 2012 (see Table 2.1), a reduction that 
was broadly based across institutions.
Jun-12
Change
Jun-12/
Jun-11
Relative weight
Jun-11
Relative weight
Jun-12
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Cash and balances with central banks 146,123 7.3 3.6 3.6
Loans and advances to credit institutions 228,032 10.1 5.4 5.7
General government 124,915 24.9 2.6 3.1
Other private sectors 2,359,810 -0.1 61.8 58.8
Debt securities 540,564 6.6 13.3 13.5
Other equity instruments 37,608 -34.4 1.5 0.9
Investments 56,262 8.1 1.4 1.4
Derivatives 266,569 71.0 4.1 6.6
Tangible assets 50,518 -5.8 1.4 1.3
Other (a) 205,954 9.6 4.9 5.1
TOTAL ASSETS 4,016,355 5.2 100 100
MEMORANDUM ITEMS:
    Financing to private sector 2,470,576 -0.3 64.9 61.5
    Financing to general government 471,832 16.1 10.6 11.7
    Total doubtful assets 194,292 34.5 3.8 4.8
    Total doubtful assets ratio 6.0 140 (c)
    Provisions for bad debts and country risk -118,900 40.9 -2.2 -3.0
Jun-12
Change
Jun-12/
Jun-11
Relative weight
Jun-11
Relative weight
Jun-12
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Balances of central banks 411,602 370.2 2.3 10.2
Deposits of credit institutions 465,890 -9.2 13.4 11.6
General government 95,494 -2.6 2.6 2.4
Other private sectors 1,746,968 -4.0 47.6 43.5
Marketable debt securities 507,413 -7.8 14.4 12.6
Derivatives 242,588 66.8 3.8 6.0
Subordinated debt 72,889 -25.0 2.5 1.8
Provisions for pensions, tax and other 33,192 -3.3 0.9 0.8
Other (a) 223,565 -10.1 6.5 5.6
TOTAL LIABILITIES 3,799,601 5.7 94.1 94.6
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
    Eurosystem net lending (b) 378,176 1.3 9.4
Minority interests 23,621 34.2 0.5 0.6
Valuation adjustments relating to total equity -17,445 . -0.2 -0.4
Own funds 210,578 -2.3 5.6 5.2
TOTAL EQUITY 216,754 -3.6 5.9 5.4
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 4,016,355 5.2 100 100
ASSETS
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET. 
DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS 
TABLE 2.1 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The remaining assets and liabilities entries not explicitly considered, including valuation adjustments, are included in "Other".
b Difference between funds received in liquidity providing operations and funds delivered in absorbing operations. September 2012 data.
c Difference calculated in bp.
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On the liabilities side (see Table 2.1), balances from central banks grew sharply (up 370.2% 
from June 2011). This notable increase reflected operations with the Eurosystem, which has 
provided long-term liquidity in response to the tensions on euro area financial markets, and 
in particular in response to the dysfunctions observed in the money market. The decreases 
in financing observed in the items deposits from credit institutions (–9.2%), marketable debt 
securities (–7.8%) and subordinated debt (–25%) reflected these tensions on wholesale 
funding markets, which have been particularly intense in recent months for the institutions 
of those countries subject to the greatest market pressure in the context of the sovereign 
debt crisis, one of which was Spain. The heavier borrowing from the Eurosystem by Spanish 
institutions is apparent in the growth of net lending relative to total assets, which in June 
2012 reached 8.4%, as against 1.3% a year earlier. After a further increase in August 2012, 
when net lending reached 9.7% of total assets, a decline was recorded in September (the 
latest figure available), to 9.4% (see memorandum item in Table 2.1).
Private-sector deposits, in the consolidated balance sheet, show a negative rate of 
change, of –4%, in June 2012 relative to the previous year. As analysed in detail elsewhere 
in this edition of the FSR, and in particular in Box 2.2, the deposits of households and non-
financial corporations in Spain, which reflect the retail financing of credit institutions, have 
declined progressively over the last year. This decline has been largely due to the 
macroeconomic setting, but is also partly explained by a reallocation of agents’ portfolios, 
from deposits towards, basically, securities issued by banks, which does not entail any 
decrease in retail funds for the institutions.
The total equity of deposit institutions fell at a year-on-year rate of 3.6% in June 2012. 
However, this figure is affected by the institutions whose capital is majority-held by the 
FROB. When these are excluded, the total equity of the sector increased by around 1.5% 
between June 2011 and June 2012.
Credit to the resident private sector in business in Spain, according to financial statement 
data on a solo basis, continues to show signs of contraction. In June 2012, relative to the 
same period of the previous year, it fell by 4.7% (see Chart 2.1.A). The latest available data 
– a rate of change of –5.5% in August 2012 – show the persistence of this trend. This 
contraction in credit is broadly based across institutions, although differences in its 
intensity persist (see Chart 2.1.B).
The contraction in credit to the resident private sector is also seen to be broadly based 
across the different borrowers and sectors. Credit to individuals declined by 3.5% in June 
2012, as against a fall of 1.9% last year. The reduction in credit to individuals for purposes 
other than house purchase (–6.5% in June 2012) was greater than that in credit for housing 
(–2.9%), although the former has moderated over the last year, while the reduction in 
financing to individuals for house purchase has accelerated.
In June 2012 credit to non-financial corporations fell more strongly than that to households 
(by 6.1%, as against 3.5%, respectively). This is basically attributable to the contraction in 
credit to construction and real-estate development firms (8.6%), which is hardly unexpected 
given the far-reaching adjustment taking place in the real estate sector in Spain. In other 
sectors, the fall in credit was less pronounced (3.8% in June 2012), although it has been 
progressively more marked since June 2011, and broadly based across the various sectors 
(see Chart 2.1.C). When distinguishing firms other than those engaged in construction and 
real-estate development by their size (as proxied by outstanding bank debt recorded in the 
CCR), a progressive decline is also apparent (see Chart 2.1.D).
Balances of central 
banks increased significantly, 
reflecting Eurosystem 
operations, while deposits of 
credit institutions, marketable 
debt securities and 
subordinated debt decreased
Private-sector deposits also 
declined, partly due to weak 
business conditions and partly 
due to a certain reallocation 
of liabilities-side customer 
portfolios (increase in fixed-
income securities issued 
by banks)
There was a decline in credit 
to the resident private sector 
in Spain, which was broadly 
based across institutions
This contraction in credit is 
seen both for individuals …
…and for non-financial 
corporations 
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The contraction in credit to the resident private sector is explained by several factors. The 
tensions still affecting wholesale markets make it difficult for institutions to fund customer 
lending. In addition, weak business conditions entail, on one hand, a reduction in the 
creditworthiness of firms and households, hampering their access to credit, and, on the 
other, a lower demand for funds, as a result of the economy’s cyclical position. From a 
more structural perspective, the trend in credit is consistent with a necessary process of 
deleveraging in the Spanish economy, following years of constantly and sharply rising 
indebtedness.
The doubtful assets of the resident private sector in business in Spain, according to 
individual financial statement data, grew at a rate of 36.1% in June 2012, relative to the 
same period of the previous year. The rise in the rate of growth of doubtful assets is apparent 
from late 2010, and the latest data, for August 2012 (year-on-year growth of 41.1%) confirm 
that it is continuing. The increase in doubtful assets is largely explained by the increase in 
The increase in doubtful 
assets in Spain is explained 
primarily by that associated 
with the construction and real 
estate development sectors,...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Corporation size is proxied by the volume of bank debt reported to the Banco de España Central Credit Register.
CREDIT TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR, BUSINESS IN SPAIN 
Deposit institutions, ID 
CHART 2.1 
-15 
-10 
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
 CONSTRUCTION AND REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT 
 NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, EXCL. CONSTR. AND REAL ESTATE DVPT 
 HOUSING 
 HOUSEHOLDS, EXCL. HOUSING 
 GDP 
 TOTAL 
% 
A. RATE OF CHANGE IN CREDIT TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR BY 
SECTOR OF ACTIVITY  
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
Jun-10 Sep-10 Dec-10 Mar-11 Jun-11 Sep-11 Dec-11 Mar-12 Jun-12 
Jun-08 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11 Jun-12  
 AGRICULTURE, HUNTING AND FISHING 
 MINING AND QUARRYING 
 MANUFACTURING 
 ENERGY 
 WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE, AND REPAIRS 
 ACCOMMODATION AND FOOD SERVICE ACTIVITIES 
 TRANSPORT, STORAGE AND COMMUNICATION 
 OTHER BUSINESS SERVICES 
 OTHER SERVICES 
 RATE OF CHANGE 
% 
C. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RATE OF CHANGE IN CREDIT TO NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS, EXCLUDING CONSTRUCTION AND REAL ESTATE 
DEVELOPMENT, OF DIFFERENT SECTORS OF ACTIVITY 
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 
 JUNE 2011 
 JUNE 2012 
B. RATE OF CHANGE IN CREDIT TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR. 
DISPERSION ACROSS INSTITUTIONS 
-10 
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
Dec-10 Mar -11 Jun-11 Sep -11 Dec-11 Mar -12 Jun -12 
 < €1 MILLION 
 €1-5 MILLION 
 €5-10 MILLION 
 €10-25 MILLION 
 > €25 MILLION 
% 
D. RATE OF CHANGE IN CREDIT TO NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 
EXCLUDING CONSTRUCTION AND REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT, BY SIZE OF 
CORPORATION (a) 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2012
those associated with the construction and real estate development sector, which is 
undergoing a far reaching process of adjustment (see Chart 2.2.A). In the rest of the non-
financial sectors the increase was more modest, although it stepped up as the year went by 
(see Chart 2.2.B), which is explained by the persistently weak economic situation.
The doubtful assets ratio for credit to the resident private sector in Spain continued to 
rise, to reach 9.9% in June 2012 (see Chart 2.2.C; 10.8% on the latest data, for August 
2012). Most of this increase stems from the increase in the volume of doubtful assets, 
although a proportion, which rose as the year elapsed, is due to the decline in credit (the 
denominator of the ratio; see Chart 2.2.D).
The doubtful assets ratio for individuals stood at 3.8% in June 2012, having shown a 
tendency to rise over the previous twelve months (from 3.04% in June 2011). The weakness 
of economic activity, along with the labour market situation in Spain, explains this increase 
in the doubtful assets ratio, although it remains relatively low for credit to individuals for 
house purchase (3.1% in June 2012, as against 7.5% for credit to individuals for purposes 
other than house purchase).
...being more modest, 
although rising, for other 
sectors
The doubtful assets ratio 
continued to rise, owing 
to the increase in doubtful 
assets and, to a lesser extent, 
the contraction of credit
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As argued in previous editions of the FSR, a number of factors help to explain this level of 
the doubtful assets ratio for retail mortgage credit, among which the following are noteworthy. 
First, Spanish institutions did not develop an originate-to-distribute model nor did they 
market significant amounts of more risky products, such as buy-to-let mortgages and 
mortgages to finance consumer goods. Second, the interest rates borne by the existing 
portfolio are linked to variable reference rates and the agreed spreads are smaller than those 
that would be applied in new transactions. Third, from the viewpoint of the structure of the 
retail mortgage market, the percentage of principal residences in Spain is almost 90%. 
Fourth, socio-economic factors, such as family support to the debtors. And finally, the 
incentives to default are also low insofar as borrowers have unlimited liability for any amount 
that may still be owed to the institution after the security has been enforced.
For credit to non-financial corporations, the doubtful assets ratio reached 16.8% in June 2012, 
strongly influenced by the high level of doubtful assets in the construction and real estate 
development sector (27% in June 2012). Excluding firms classified in this sector, the doubtful 
assets ratio of non-financial corporations stands at 7.8%, although it has been rising since 
June last year. The rise in the ratio, in line with the trend in doubtful assets referred to above, is 
broadly based across branches of activity other than construction and real estate development.
In a macroeconomic setting like the present one, in which, according to the latest IMF and 
market consensus projections, the contraction can be expected to continue in 2013, the rise 
in the doubtful asset ratio may be expected to continue too, as a result of the persistence in 
the growth of doubtful assets and in the contraction of credit. The measures of recapitalisation 
and transfer to the Asset Management Company for Assets Arising from  Bank Restructuring 
(Sareb) of the impaired assets identified by the stress tests, as well as those introduced by 
the Royal Decree-Laws 2/2012, 18/2012 and 24/2012, are intended to reinforce the 
confidence concerning the valuation of real-estate assets and to lessen uncertainty over 
the impact of a potential further deterioration in the loan portfolio of Spanish institutions.1
The wholesale funding of Spanish deposit institutions is still problematic, in a situation in 
which euro area financial market developments continue to be driven by the sovereign 
debt crisis. Following a certain relieving of tensions in the first few months of the year, 
which opened a window of opportunity in the primary markets, between May and June 
uncertainty intensified considerably and there was a notable tightening of financing 
conditions, the most affected countries being Spain and Italy.
Since late July tensions have abated somewhat, especially after the ECB announced its 
plans for unlimited intervention in euro area secondary sovereign bond markets, subject to 
the conditions established for the country in connection with whose debt the ECB were to 
intervene (see Box 2.1). In these circumstances, in which financing conditions on wholesale 
primary markets have become relatively easier, the volume of issuance by European 
institutions, including Spanish ones, has increased. Thus, even though the number of 
Spanish banks that issued debt in recent months was limited, there has been a certain 
recovery in the volume of issuance, although it has remained lower than in the first few 
months of the year (see Chart 2.3.A). In any event, financial market tensions are persisting 
and this is being passed through to financing conditions.
The euro area money markets continued to be characterised by their weak activity. The 
ongoing lack of confidence due to the sovereign debt crisis meant that interbank market 
The doubtful assets ratio 
for retail mortgage credit 
remains low, as a result 
of various factors
The doubtful assets ratio 
for non-financial corporations 
was particularly influenced 
by the changes in the ratio 
for the construction and real 
estate development sectors
Given the macroeconomic 
projections, the doubtful 
assets ratio can be expected 
to continue to rise, although 
the confidence concerning 
asset valuation should be 
reinforced after the recent 
rigorous stress tests
The sovereign debt crisis 
drove developments on 
funding markets
Tensions have been partly 
alleviated by the measures 
agreed by the ECB, but they 
remain present on financial 
markets
Money market activity 
continued to be weak…
1  Box 2.1 in the previous (April 2012) FSR analyses the key aspects of RDL 2/2012.
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activity continued to be significantly lower than in previous years. The EONIA trading 
volumes show how, after a weak recovery in the closing months of 2011, trading resumed 
a downward path and, in summer 2012, reached very low levels even below those in the 
first half of 2010 (see Chart 2.3.B). Following the ECB’s announcement of the aforementioned 
programme to intervene in the sovereign debt secondary markets, activity rallied, although 
remaining very weak. In the Spanish interbank market, both the unsecured segment and 
the repo segment recorded behaviour similar to that noted above for the EONIA.
The funding difficulties caused deposit institutions to turn increasingly to Eurosystem 
funds. From end-April to end-October 2012 (see Chart 2.3.C), institutions resident in 
Spain increased their gross funding from the Eurosystem by €48,013 m (+15%), while the 
outstanding balance in the total Eurosystem fell by €3,926 (–0.3%). Most of the recourse 
continued to be through main refinancing operations. The change for the whole of the 
period was affected somewhat because banks have generally reduced their funding from 
the central bank  in recent months as a result of the additional measures taken by the ECB 
and the consequent improvement in the money markets.
The percentage of total Eurosystem lending received by Spanish institutions increased 
further in this period, although in September 2012 (latest data available) it was slightly 
lower than in August. Thus, the volume allotted in tenders to institutions resident in Spain 
relative to the total funds supplied by the Eurosystem averaged 33% in September 2012 
(34% in August), while it had been 28% in April (see Chart 2.3.D).
…which prompted greater 
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private creditors. Additionally, as under the securities market 
programme (SMP), the cumulative balance resulting from OMTs 
will be published weekly and the liquidity generated will be fully 
sterilised. These operations mark the end of the previous securities 
market programme (SMP), although its outstanding balances will 
continue to be sterilised.
Second, the ECB Governing Council has also adopted various 
measures to preserve the availability of collateral. Specifically, in 
June it decided to reduce the credit rating threshold and change 
the admission criteria for certain asset-backed securities, thus 
widening the scope of the measures adopted earlier in this 
connection in December 2011. For the same purpose, in September 
it was decided to suspend application of the minimum credit rating 
threshold on collateral used in Eurosystem credit operations 
involving marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by 
central government, as well as for loans granted to or guaranteed 
by the central government of countries that are eligible for OMTs 
or included in a European Union and IMF programme and meet 
the associated conditions. It was also decided to accept as 
collateral for Eurosystem credit operations, with the related 
haircuts, marketable debt instruments denominated in currencies 
other than the euro (specifically, US dollars, pounds sterling or 
Japanese yen) but issued and held in the euro area. Measures of 
this type were first used temporarily between October 2008 and 
December 2010.
In view of the persistence of the European sovereign debt crisis, 
the last few months have seen further measures by the Eurosystem 
to combat its negative effects. Besides cutting policy interest rates 
in July 2012, the Eurosystem has taken various decisions designed 
to remedy the poor functioning of the money market transmission 
mechanisms and to give European credit institutions readier 
access to funding.
First, in August the Governing Council of the European Central 
Bank (ECB) declared its intention to carry out intervention 
operations in the euro area sovereign debt secondary markets to 
attempt to correct the distortions in monetary policy transmission. 
The technical characteristics of these operations, known as 
outright monetary transactions (OMT), were announced in 
September. They are outright transactions which necessarily 
subject the country involved to strict and effective conditions set 
out in an appropriate programme of the European Financial 
Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM). It is 
envisaged that the IMF will participate in the design of those 
conditions and in programme monitoring. Based on market 
behaviour and on its monetary policy mandate, the ECB Governing 
Council will decide discretionally on the commencement, 
continuation and suspension of OMTs, for which no ex ante 
quantitative limits have been set. The operations focus on the 
short end of the yield curve and, in respect of bonds purchased 
under OMTs, the Eurosystem will have the same credit status as 
BOX 2.1RECENT MEASURES OF THE EUROSYSTEM
The retail deposits received by Spanish deposit institutions (deposits from households and 
non-financial corporations) contracted by 5.2% year-on-year in June 2012, and this trend 
persisted in the August data (–5.9%), which are the latest available. This development is 
explained by two factors: first, agents are less able to accumulate financial assets in a setting 
of deleverage and declining income, and, second, households and non-financial corporations 
have somewhat rebalanced their portfolio, reducing their holdings of deposits and increasing 
those of bank debt securities issued by institutions themselves. This rebalancing of the bank 
customer portfolio entails no loss of retail funds for institutions (see Box 2.2).
The retail deposits received 
by Spanish institutions have 
shrunk partly due to the 
economic conjuncture, but 
also due to a reallocation of 
liabilities-side customer 
portfolios which entails no loss 
of retail funds for institutions
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In any event, strong competition persists among banks to attract retail saving. This 
competition affects other institutions as well, such as investment and pension funds, 
which, moreover, operate in difficult financial market conditions. Hence, despite a slight 
rise in the net assets of both investment funds and pension funds in the first quarter of the 
year, the downward trend characterising their activity since the onset of the crisis persisted 
in the second quarter. The lack of confidence, the tension and the uncertainty weighing 
on the financial markets were behind this negative performance (see Chart 2.4.A). 
Net subscriptions of investment funds continued to be negative in all months of 2012 
(continuing a trend dating from 2011 Q2). Meanwhile, investment fund yields reversed 
their adverse performance in 2012 and from June there were three consecutive months of 
positive yields (see Chart 2.4.B).
Deposit institutions recorded a consolidated loss attributable to the controlling entity of 
€3,124 million (m) between January and June 2012 (see Table 2.2). This contrasts with the 
positive result in the same period a year earlier (€7,836 m). This loss put the return on 
assets (ROA) at –0.17%, compared with 0.44% in June 2011. The return on equity (ROE) 
declined from 7.4% in June 2011 to –3% a year later.
The loss before tax of deposit institutions as a whole was €7,872 m. There are 28 
consolidated groups with a loss totalling €13,857 m. This generated a tax effect which 
offset those generated by the 84 institutions with profits, so the net income after tax is 
higher than that before tax by €3,133 m.
The downward pressure 
on investment and pension 
fund assets continues
2.2 Profitability
The consolidated net income 
of deposit institutions was 
negative…
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Jun-11 Jun-12
€m
% Change
Jun-12/Jun-11
% ATA % ATA
Financial revenue 70,342 7.2 3.65 3.80
Financial costs 35,619 3.4 1.91 1.93
Net interest income 34,723 11.4 1.73 1.88
Return on capital instruments 1,138 -20.7 0.08 0.06
Share of projt or loss of entities accounted for using the equity method 1,468 -38.4 0.13 0.08
Net commissions 11,973 0.6 0.66 0.65
Gains and losses on jnancial assets and liabilities 4,476 10.0 0.23 0.24
Other operating income (net) -1,553 . -0.02 -0.08
Gross income 52,226 3.3 2.81 2.82
Operating expenses 25,023 0.2 1.39 1.35
Net operating income 27,203 6.4 1.42 1.47
Asset impairment losses (specijc and general provisions) 29,188 139.2 0.68 1.58
Provisioning expense (net) 2,896 28.9 0.12 0.16
Operating projt -4,881 . 0.62 -0.26
Asset impairment losses (assets other than loans and credits) 4,347 70.6 0.14 0.24
Income from disposals (net) 1,356 -20.2 0.09 0.07
Projt before tax -7,872 . 0.57 -0.43
Net income -4,739 . 0.49 -0.26
MEMORANDUM ITEM
    Income attributable to the controlling entity -3,124 . 0.44 -0.17
Jun-12
CONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENT 
Deposit institutions. January-June 2012 
TABLE 2.2 
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1  For a detailed analysis of deposits in general, and of those by sectors 
other than households and non-financial corporations in particular, see 
the article entitled “Analysis of recent changes in bank deposits in 
Spain” in the September 2012 Economic Bulletin of the Banco de 
España.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Four-quarter cumulated data until 2012 Q2.
b A positive value in this series shows that the credit-deposits gap is widening, while a negative value shows that the gap is narrowing.
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BOX 2.2CHANGES IN DEPOSITS OF HOUSEHOLDS AND NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN SPAIN
high. This was so even though the net financial saving of those 
sectors (i.e. the difference between their income and their 
expenditure) was negative. Hence that rise in assets was only 
possible because the sector’s total liabilities (basically bank loans) 
rose by an even greater amount. After the global financial and 
economic crisis broke out in 2007-2008, credit conditions 
tightened notably for fresh funds and the demand for funds 
dropped. Thus net borrowing tended to fall and turned negative. 
Against this background, despite the sector’s net financial saving 
becoming positive, the purchase of financial assets also contracted 
notably. The lower capacity to accumulate financial assets was 
also a result of weak income growth against a backdrop of job 
destruction and economic recession. 
The deposits of resident households and non-financial corporations 
with Spanish banks showed an upward trend until June 2011. 
Since then they have shrunk progressively, their year-on-year rate 
of change being -5.9% in August 2012 (see Chart A). The behaviour 
of deposits of this type is important for banks because these funds 
are of a retail nature and are hence more stable vis-à-vis changes 
in financial markets and in the perception of risk by investors. 
Notably, of all bank deposits, these are the clearest example of 
stable retail funding.1 It is therefore important to analyse the 
factors behind their recent behaviour.
The changes in this item in recent months are explained, first, by 
the changes in financial asset purchases by households and 
firms, and, second, by shifts between deposits and other 
instruments.
Chart B shows how, in the latest expansionary phase of the 
Spanish economy, the volume of financial assets purchased by 
Spanish households and non-financial corporations was very 
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BOX 2.2
Moreover, to that factor must be added a certain recent portfolio 
rebalancing by households and firms towards other financial 
assets and away from bank deposits (see Chart C). Thus these 
agents purchased a significant volume of bank securities (€32 bn 
between September 2011 and July 2012). Additionally, deposits 
abroad increased moderately in the past 12 months according to 
balance of payments data, as did holdings of State government 
debt securities, although only residually in the latter case.
The rapid increase in holdings of bank-issued debt largely reflected 
a change in the marketing of securities (mainly commercial paper) 
amongst bank customers, which is explained by the regulatory 
changes introduced in 2011. In June last year, and in order to 
adjust the contributions required for the risks assumed, Royal 
Decree 771/2011 increased fivefold the compulsory contributions 
that deposit-taking institutions had to make to deposit guarantee 
funds for all deposits earning interest at rates exceeding the 
reference rates set above certain thresholds. Additionally, in 
December 2011, Royal Decree-Law 19/2011 raised the general 
contribution to the new credit institution deposit guarantee fund to 
2 per mille of the base used for the calculation. Both measures 
reduced the relative attractiveness of deposits for banks compared 
with other instruments, such as securities, not subject to such 
contributions, which explains the interest of banks in promoting 
some interchangeability between them. This effect has presumably 
been weakened by the removal in August this year (Royal Decree-
Law 24/2012) of the penalties on high-interest deposits, so the shift 
from deposits to notes will foreseeably reverse somewhat in the 
coming months.
Given that the aforementioned policy of banks does not entail a loss 
of customer funds, but rather merely that they are reallocated to 
alternative instruments, the sum of deposits and issued debt 
securities held by Spanish households and non-financial corporations 
gives a more accurate picture of the recent trend in retail funding 
than does the behaviour of deposits alone. Chart A shows that this 
aggregate also posted a negative year-on-year rate of change in 
August 2012, but that it was significantly smaller, in absolute 
terms, than that of deposits alone (2.4% compared with 5.9%). 
Similarly, a measure of the change in the households and firms 
loan-deposit gap adjusted for the increase in holdings of debt 
securities, suggests that this indicator has continued to decrease 
in recent months, at a rate not very different from the average 
recorded since 2010 (see Chart D).
CHANGES IN DEPOSITS OF HOUSEHOLDS AND NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN SPAIN (cont’d)
The worsening of results with respect to the first half of 2011 was across the board. 
Although what is observed is a reduction in ROA, albeit to differing extents, for most 
institutions, the loss recorded by the system as a whole is due to the (significant) negative 
result recorded by institutions majority owned by the FROB. Excluding these institutions 
from the analysis, consolidated income attributable to the controlling entity is positive in 
the amount of €2,778 m (€3,276 m before tax).
Apart from the notable impact of these institutions on the sector as a whole, the weaker 
results are largely explained by the significant increase in asset impairment losses. This 
increase reflects the higher provisioning requirements derived from RDL 2/2012 and RDL 
18/2012, as well as the slump in economic activity.
Net interest income grew by 11.4% in the past 12 months. This growth was based on an 
increase in financial income (7.2%) outweighing that in financial costs (3.4%). In terms of 
ATA, net interest income rose from 1.73% in June 2011 to 1.88% in June 2012. This pick-
up in net interest income, which had decreased by 12.7% between June 2009 and June 
2011, was basically caused by a wider spread between the average return on assets and 
the average cost of liabilities, perceptible in business in Spain (see Chart 2.5.A).
The average return on investments and the average cost of liabilities was more than sufficient 
to offset the adverse effect on net interest income arising from the contraction in activity (see 
Chart 2.5.B). The relative moderation in financial costs was partly because institutions stepped 
up their recourse to funding from the central bank, reflecting their participation in the unlimited 
refinancing operations introduced by the ECB in late 2011 and early 2012 (LTROs).
Within financial income, that from the government, including both debt securities and 
loans, increased. Also up was financial income from the rest of the resident and non-
… due largely to 
the institutions majority 
owned by the FROB
Net interest income grew…
…due to the favourable 
behaviour of interest rates 
on loans and deposits
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resident private sector. The current setting in which institutions have been operating, 
characterised by slower credit extension activity, was offset by the higher interest rate on 
new loans. This interest rate continues the upward trend seen since end-2010, which has 
gradually fed through to the whole of the credit portfolio (see Chart 2.5.C).
However, funding conditions on wholesale financial markets and strong competition for 
retail savings put upward pressure on financial costs, feeding through to the net interest 
income of the sector which must persist with its process of restructuring and of 
rationalisation of overheads.
Net commissions recorded a slight increase in the first half of 2012 compared with the 
same period in 2011 (0.6%). Commission revenue was particularly bolstered by commissions 
received for collection and payment services, offsetting the reduction of those related to 
the marketing of non-bank financial products.
Net commissions recorded 
a slight increase
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Marginal interest rates are those established in transactions initiated or renewed during the month prior to that of reference, such transactions being weighted by 
their volume. The assets-weighted marginal rates include, inter alia, those applied to housing and consumer jnance and credit to non-jnancial corporations, while 
the liabilities-weighted ones include, inter alia, jxed-term deposits and repos.  
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Operating expenses grew moderately (0.2% year-on-year in June 2012). Their weight in 
terms of ATA decreased from 1.39% in June 2011 to 1.35% a year later. If Spanish banks 
with a large presence abroad are stripped out of the analysis, operating expenses 
dropped by 8.5%. The situation of the business in Spain and the various bank 
restructuring processes explain the continual reduction in the number of employees (see 
Chart 2.6.A) and offices (see Chart 2.6.B) from the peaks of 2008 (a cumulative decrease 
of more than 13% in both cases). The numbers of employees and offices were similar to 
their pre-crisis levels and to those at the end of the 1990s, although it could be expected 
that under the current circumstances in the sector further efforts will be made to 
rationalise overheads.
Asset impairment losses, which reflect the specific and general provisions recorded, grew 
very considerably in the last year (year-on-year rate of change of 139% in June 2012). In terms 
of ATA, they increased from 0.68% in June 2011 to 1.58% in June 2012. This strong growth 
was conditioned partly by the approval of RDL 2/2012 of 3 February 2012 on balance sheet 
clean-up of the financial sector and RDL 18/2012 of 11 May 2012 on the write-down and sale 
of the financial sector’s real estate assets. These measures, which were established in the 
RDLs, represent additional provisioning requirements for banks. During the first half of the 
year and, to differing degrees, the banks recorded ahead of schedule the additional provisions 
required, which resulted in the increase seen in total provisioning by deposit institutions. In 
addition to the importance of the regulatory changes, developments in the macroeconomic 
environment, which led to an increase in doubtful assets, also contributed to the increase in 
asset impairment losses. Consequently, the percentage of net operating income absorbed by 
impairment losses has grown considerably (see Chart 2.5.D for business in Spain).
Developments in impairment losses were different across banks. Thus, the banks which 
contributed most to the growth rate of 139% are, on one hand, banks that recorded ahead 
of schedule the provisions required by the RDLs, and, on the other, banks in which the 
FROB has a controlling stake. It is precisely at the latter where provisions absorbed the 
highest percentage of net operating income.
Impairment losses on other assets also grew very sharply in June 2012 (70.6% year-on-
year), partly due to the higher provisions associated with foreclosed assets, which also 
rose notably in this period as a result of developments in the real estate sector and of the 
above-mentioned regulatory changes.
Operating expenses 
grew moderately
Asset impairment losses 
posted strong growth 
Impairment losses on other 
assets also grew notably
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Since the summer months, as a consequence of the various above-mentioned factors 
which brought some relief to the financial strains, a recovery was seen in the stock market 
prices of Spanish banks. This recovery was also seen among large European banks (see 
Chart 2.7.A). This rise improved banks’ price-to-book value ratio which, however, due to 
the adverse performance during the crisis, continues to hold at less than one at most 
banks. Both as regards this recovery and the price-to-book value ratio, Spanish banks are 
in an intermediate position compared with their European peers (see Chart 2.7.B), although 
evidencing high dispersion.
The solvency ratio of deposit institutions stood at 11.4% in June 2012, 40 bp lower than 
in June 2011. The tier 1 ratio fell slightly to 9.4% in June 2012 (from 9.8% a year earlier), 
while the “capital principal” ratio (a requirement introduced by RDL 2/2011 and amended 
by RDL 24/2012) stood at 9% in June 2012 (see Chart 2.8). The levels of the solvency 
ratios, as well as the changes in them over the last year, are influenced by banks in which 
the FROB has a majority holding. If these banks are stripped out of the analysis, the total 
solvency ratio in June 2012 is 12.3%, the tier 1 ratio is 10.6% (both increased by around 
60 bp in relation to June 2011) and the “capital principal” ratio would reach 10.1% in 
June 2012.
In June 2012 the rate of decline in total own funds quickened by 1.8 pp, a year-on-year 
fall of 7.7%. Excluding the banks controlled by the FROB, own funds rose by 7 pp 
(posting a year-on-year growth rate of 1.1%). Furthermore, there has been an increase in 
the quality of solvency. Thus, the weight of lower-quality own funds in total own funds 
has decreased from 20.8% to 19.2%, as a result of their 14.8% decline. Tier 1 capital 
decreased by 9.1 pp, posting a decline of 7% (see Chart 2.9.B). For banks which are not 
majority-owned by the FROB, tier 1 capital has increased 1%, whereas tier 2 capital has 
fallen 8.9%. 
Tier 1 capital grew 36.6%, 10.5 pp up on the previous year, at the expense of preference 
shares (which decreased by 41.3%, 59 pp less than in 2011) and of reserves (which were 
down 15.5%) (see Chart 2.9.C), this decline mostly reflecting the situation of banks 
owned by the FROB.
The stock market prices of 
Spanish and European banks 
have performed favourably 
in recent months
2.3 Solvency
The “capital principal” ratio 
based on RDL 2/2011 stood 
at 9% in June 2012
An improvement was seen 
in the quality of own funds
SOURCE: Datastream.
a Each bar represents an institution. Latest data: 26 October 2012.
b Each pair of bars represents an institution.
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The fall in tier 2 capital (see Chart 2.9.D) was triggered mainly by the decline of 11.7% in 
subordinated debt (the component with the highest weight of 80%), in line with the search 
for higher-quality own funds. Meanwhile, the general provisions eligible to be counted as 
own funds (with a weight of 18%) fell 5.6%.
The decrease in risk weighted assets slowed in 2012 with respect to the previous year. 
Credit risk requirements, with a weight of 87% in total requirements, fell for the second 
year running at a rate of 5.7%, similar to that in 2011 (see Chart 2.9.A). 
SOURCE: SNL Europe.
a The biggest banks in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom are taken. Each panel depicts 
the banks in descending order for the variable in question.  
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BOX 2.3ACCOUNTING CONVERGENCE: NETTING AND PROVISIONS
Introduction
Further to the reflections outlined in previous editions of the 
Financial Stability Report, two aspects of particular significance 
for banking continue to arouse concerns regarding convergence 
between the chief standard-setters IASB and FASB. The aim of 
this box is to explain the differences in accounting treatment in 
these two areas (the possibility of offsetting assets and liabilities 
by presenting rights and obligations as a net amount, e.g. in 
operations with derivatives and in the model to be applied for the 
estimation of asset impairment losses arising from credit risk), 
while at the same time reporting on the current status of the 
debate between IASB and FASB on these two questions.
Offsetting of assets and liabilities (netting)
For the IASB, financial offsetting is applicable if, in addition to 
being party to a netting agreement with the legal right to demand 
netting, there is an intention to use it. The rule indicates that 
netting agreements, in which the right to net arises in default or 
other circumstances that do not usually occur in the normal course 
of business, do not per se fulfil the requirements for presenting 
rights and obligations as a net amount.
Under FASB rules, netting is generally allowed under the same 
circumstances as permitted by the IASB, except for derivatives 
included in master netting arrangements, for which the intention to 
settle open positions net is not required.
Various negotiations between the IASB and FASB failed to reach a 
common position and both have concluded that they will not 
converge on this matter. However, they have agreed that, from 
2013, they will both require a breakdown in explanatory notes 
regarding netting of positions in the statement of financial position.
The significance of this matter particularly affects banks, especially 
those that are very active in derivatives on wholesale markets, 
such as investment banks, with a demonstrable impact on their 
balance sheet and, therefore, on their leverage.1
Thus, the consequences for banks under IFRSs or under FASB 
may be significant not only in terms of the different amounts of 
assets shown on their balance sheets but also because of the 
prudential consequences that may arise from this.
Credit portfolio impairment
The management of credit risk is the essence of the banking 
business. Accordingly, the proper estimate of credit impairment is 
essential for a correct interpretation of its results. Five years on 
since the financial crisis broke, agreement has still not been 
reached by the FASB and the IASB on replacing the so-called 
“incurred loss model” with a different model capable of resolving 
the rapid impairment that crisis periods - as opposed to boom 
periods - evidence. What is worse, the possibilities of an agreement 
have become even more remote in recent months, and since last 
August both regulators have been following a different route.
The improvement in the quality of own funds prompted by RDL 2/2011, is further enhanced 
by the regulatory change introduced by RDL 24/2012 in this respect. Thus, from 1 January 
2013, the “capital principal” requirement of 8% or 10% becomes a single requirement of 
9% adopting the EBA’s definition of core capital. The aim is not only to maintain the 
requirement of higher quality capital but also to favour international comparisons.
Large Spanish institutions, in relation to comparable European institutions, record capital 
ratios which stand in a medium-low position, although their ratios are similar to those of 
their European peers (see Chart 2.10.A, in which 15 of the 19 institutions, including two 
Spanish institutions, have ratios of between 12.5% and 10%). Furthermore, their European 
competitors have, in relative terms, lower risk weighted assets (see Chart 2.10.B which 
shows the higher weight of these assets as a percentage of total assets at Spanish 
institutions). The comparision of solvency ratios between banks based on the leverage 
ratio (capital to book assets) eliminates certain differences in the solvency ratios calculated 
on the basis of risk-weighted assets owing to differences in criteria in the estimation of 
capital requirements [not all differences, however, since differences in accounting criteria 
between Europe and the United States persist (see Box 2.3)] Spanish banks are in the 
upper quartile of leverage ratio values (see Chart 2.10.C).
The solvency ratios of large 
Spanish institutions stand 
in a medium-low position in 
relation to comparable 
European institutions but 
they are in a sound position 
in terms of leverage
1  Calculations of the Basel III leverage ratio will not depend on accounting 
but will rather seek uniformity by offering their own asset and liabilities 
offsetting rules, thereby neutralising the potential differences attributable 
to differing international and US accounting criteria. 
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ACCOUNTING CONVERGENCE: NETTING AND PROVISIONS (cont’d) BOX 2.3
The main obstacle encountered by the IASB to moving in step with 
the FASB is that, in the initial recognition of the loans, they should 
reflect their total expected loss; that is to say, a loss should be 
recognised on concession of the loan. The FASB argues that, in 
addressing portfolios, the valuation of the expected loss is made 
for all of them, thereby avoiding delaying the recognition of losses 
that are already expected from the outset.
Convergence
Accounting convergence has been one of the issues that has 
concerned the G20 and the FSB since the start of the crisis. Their 
publications have highlighted the importance of a convergent and 
sound accounting framework. Given how relevant and necessary 
accounting convergence is, this is an area where perseverance 
will be essential.
The model explored by the IASB seeks to reflect credit impairment 
once an economic worsening relative to the economic situation 
existing as at the date of concession is evidenced. To do this it 
divides loans into two categories: first, that of initial recognition, 
for which they propose recognising the expected loss over a 
horizon of one year; and a second category for loans that have 
already undergone an impairment, whether collective or individual, 
reflecting the total expected loss throughout its life.
The model the FASB is exploring involves a single methodology for 
all types of loans, and is based on a statistical behaviour of credit 
risk losses, under the concept of expected loss. In this way, all 
loans will reflect the entire expected loss at the initial date as an 
adjustment in respect of the amount actually drawn down. Any 
subsequent change in the expected loss should be recorded in the 
income statement for the period in which it arises.
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3  THE PROCESS OF RECAPITALISATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE SPANISH 
BANKING SECTOR
Over the last three years a number of measures have been taken to reorganise the Spanish 
banking sector. Liquidity support has been provided to institutions, the consolidation and 
restructuring of the weakest promoted, savings banks transformed into commercial banks 
and levels of capital and provisions strengthened.
Against a background characterised by the persistence of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, 
ongoing deterioration in the real economy and intense adjustment in the real-estate sector in 
Spain, it was necessary to continue shoring up the confidence of financial markets in the 
Spanish banking sector. Uncertainties persisted over the quality of the assets on the balance 
sheets of Spanish institutions, and in particular of those relating to the real-estate development 
sector. At the beginning of the year RDL 2/2012 and RDL 18/2012 were approved, which have 
significantly increased the provisioning requirements for exposures to that sector.
Also, with a view to reinforcing confidence in respect of the solvency of Spanish banks, on 11 
May 2012 the Council of Ministers assigned to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Competitiveness the task of preparing an aggregate top-down external analysis to enable the 
resilience of the Spanish banking sector in the face of a further severe deterioration in the 
economy to be assessed. The Banco de España, in coordination with the Ministry, lead-
managed this assessment, for which two independent international consultancies were hired.
The 14 principal Spanish banking groups, representing 90% of the sector, participated in 
this exercise. The purpose of the test was to provide an overall estimate of the capital 
needs of the institutions analysed, over the three-year period 2012-14. The two consultancies 
were required to use their own methodologies independently and to consider the same two 
macroeconomic scenarios. These were, first, the baseline scenario, prudently judged to 
have a greater probability of occurrence, under which a core capital ratio (as defined by the 
EBA) of 9% at the end of the above-mentioned three-year period was required. And second, 
an adverse scenario, considered very unlikely (less than 1% probability), as it incorporated 
a very severe further deterioration in the Spanish economy, under which the core ratio (EBA 
definition) had to be at least 6% as at end-2014. A core ratio of 6% under a very severe 
scenario is highly demanding and, in comparative terms, greater than that required in other 
stress tests conducted internationally. This scenario includes, for example, a cumulative 
GDP decline over the three years analysed (2012-14) of 6.5% (see Chart 3.1.A), 
unemployment rates of 27.2%, further falls in house prices of 25% and in land prices of 
60%. Considering a period of three as opposed to two years, as in other exercises, with the 
macroeconomic setting performing so adversely, reinforces the severity of the exercise.
The results of this top-down stress test conducted by independent experts, released on 21 
June, were an estimation of the recapitalisation needs of the system as €16-26 billion 
under the baseline scenario. Under the adverse scenario additional capital needs were 
estimated as lying within a range of €51-62 billion.
After the completion of this top-down stress test, which allowed a range to be set for the 
Spanish banking sector’s capital needs, the next step, a natural extension of the first, was 
to perform a bottom-up analysis of capital needs, bank by bank.
The beginning of the year saw 
approval of RDL 2/2012 and 
RDL 18/2012, which have 
significantly increased the 
provisioning requirements for 
real-estate sector exposures
Also, with a view to reinforcing 
confidence regarding the 
solvency of Spanish banks, an 
external assessment of the 
resilience of the banking 
sector on aggregate was 
commissioned
The next step was to identify 
capital needs, bank by bank, 
through a bottom-up exercise
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This second phase of the work, the results of which are analysed below in detail, was 
performed between the beginning of July and 28 September, when the results were 
published. The work was assigned to one of the independent consultancies that 
participated in the top-down stress test. Also, to maximise the rigour and exhaustiveness 
of the exercise, the four main audit firms in Spain carried out an accounting review of the 
loan portfolio and foreclosed assets of the participating banks, ensuring that the information 
was consistent, and six national and international appraisal companies were involved.
In parallel with the performance of the second phase of the estimation of the capital needs 
(the bottom-up exercise), the Spanish Government requested external financial assistance 
in the context of the process of restructuring and recapitalisation of the Spanish banking 
sector. The agreed financial assistance, of up to €100 billion, was agreed by the Eurogroup 
and included in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Spanish and 
European authorities.
A key aspect of the MoU is the review of the vulnerable segments of the Spanish banking 
sector, which requires three issues to be addressed. First, determination of the capital 
needs of each bank by means of an analysis of the quality of the assets of the banking 
sector and a stress test carried out bank by bank under a hypothetical stressed scenario. 
Second, the recapitalisation, restructuring and/or resolution of the less viable banks, on 
the basis of plans that address the capital shortfalls detected in the stress test. And third, 
the segregation of the impaired assets of those banks that would require public support 
without segregation, and their transfer to an Asset Management Company. The presentation 
of the results of the bottom-up exercise on 28 September 2012 enabled the first of the 
points mentioned above to be completed.1 The other two are currently in progress, as 
explained below, in line with the timetables agreed in the MoU.
 Organisation of the bottom-up stress tests
As mentioned above, the bottom-up stress test was a natural extension of the top-down 
one. From this viewpoint, the scope of the exercise is the same as regards the participating 
In parallel with the second 
phase of the estimation of the 
capital needs, the Government 
requested an external financial 
assistance programme in the 
context of the restructuring and 
recapitalisation of the banking 
sector
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1  For the details of the reports and documents published on that date, see http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/
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banks (fourteen main Spanish banking groups), the credit portfolio tested (lending to the 
resident private sector, including real-estate assets), the time period considered (2012, 
2013 and 2014) and the macroeconomic scenarios (the baseline and adverse scenarios).
The main difference between the bottom-up exercise and the previous top-down one is 
that significantly more information is required to carry out the former. Thus, comprehensive 
bank-by-bank information was used, which, along with the harshness of the 
macroeconomic scenario considered and the governance process, guaranteed the rigour 
of the exercise.
The information used in the exercise was characterised by its comprehensiveness and 
came, basically, from four sources.
i.  Granular loan-by-loan information. The banks’ own databases and those 
available at the Banco de España were used, with detailed information on 36 
million loans and 8 million guarantees. This information (with details of 
exposure, whether the loans are performing or non-performing, the location 
of the borrower or of the real-estate asset, the sector of activity, LTV ratios, 
etc.) was supplemented by data from the Banco de España Central Credit 
Register (monthly observations loan-by-loan from 1989 to 2011).
ii.  Audit-generated information. The four main audit firms in Spain, with the 
involvement of more than 400 auditors, verified the quality of the data to be 
used in the exercise, as well as analysing the correctness of the level of 
provisions in more than 115,000 transactions.
iii.  Asset valuation review. Six real-estate appraisal companies (three national 
and three international) performed a highly detailed cross-Spain review of 
foreclosed assets and collateral. In all, 1.7 million automatic appraisals were 
performed and 8,000 singular assets were valued individually.
iv.  Bank business plans. The banks’ business plans for the next three years 
were taken into account. The business plans made available to the 
independent consultancy by the banks were also adjusted to ensure that the 
assumptions made by each bank were fully compatible, when all are taken 
into account together, with the exercise scenarios and hypotheses validated 
by the Spanish and European authorities.
The severity of the exercise is reflected in the levels of probability of default (PD) used. For 
example, in the adverse macroeconomic scenario, the cumulative PD for developers is 
three times as high as the non-performing loans ratio observed in June 2012, and is also 
three times the ratio for firms and five times the non-performing loans ratio for personal 
mortgages (see Chart 3.1.B).
Finally, the third of the elements that have been mentioned as contributing to the high 
degree of rigour in the exercise is the governance process. A governance regime was 
established that was designed to ensure the work is of the highest possible quality, with 
the same methodology applied consistently to all the participating groups. The governance 
of the tests involved Spanish authorities (the Banco de España, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Competitiveness and the FROB) and international authorities (the European 
The main difference between 
the bottom-up exercise and 
the top-down one lies in the 
comprehensiveness of the 
information used. The 
strictness of the bottom-up 
exercise and its governance 
contribute significantly to 
its rigour
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Commission, the European Central Bank, the European Banking Authority and the 
International Monetary Fund, as advisor).
The governance structure was established on two levels. At one level, an Expert 
Coordination Committee (ECC) was set up to monitor the work closely and continuously, 
to control the exercise at the technical level, and to question and validate the consultancy’s 
working hypotheses. At a second level, a Strategic Coordination Committee (SCC), made 
up of high-level representatives of the institutions involved, was set up to take decisions 
and check the results. Accordingly, the main task of the SCC was to validate the results on 
the basis of the ECC’s recommendations.
 Results of the bank-by-bank stress tests
The bottom-up stress tests resulted in estimated additional capital needs for the total 
banks considered of €25.9 billion under the baseline scenario (€27.4 billion after the tax 
effect) and of €59.3 billion under the adverse scenario (€55.9 billion after the tax effect). 
These figures do not take into account the integration processes under way. These capital 
needs are in line with those reflected in the top-down exercise and are significantly lower 
than the financing of up to €100 billion agreed with the European authorities.
The breakdown of the 14 banking groups considered shows that seven of them, 
representing 62% of the total credit portfolio analysed, do not need more capital under the 
adverse scenario. The other seven groups, representing 38% of the total credit portfolio, 
have additional capital needs, which are largely concentrated in those in which the FROB 
has a majority holding (see Charts 3.2.A and 3.2.B).
Next steps in the bank recapitalisation and restructuring process
The capital needs disclosed by the stress test do not represent the final amount of State aid 
which will derive from the process. The need for aid will depend on the various actions to be 
undertaken by banks to reduce their capital needs, which can be summarised as follows: 1) 
sale of assets held by banks; 2) raising of capital from private investors; 3) transfer of assets 
to the Asset Management Company for Assets Arising from Bank Restructuring (Sareb);2 
and 4) implementation of loss-assumption exercises by the holders of hybrid instruments 
(see Box 3.1). These four elements will be specified during the process whose steps are 
indicated below.
First, banks will be classified into four groups on the basis of the recapitalisation plans of 
the banks having a capital shortfall under the stress test, and of the review of those plans 
by the authorities.
i.  Group 0: already known, since it is formed by the banks which do not need 
more capital.
ii.  Group 1: already known, since it consists of the four banks owned by the 
FROB.
iii.  Group 2: banks which will require State aid.
iv.  Group 3: banks which have until 30 June 2013 to execute their recapitalisation 
plan and reach the required capital without need for State aid from then on.
The additional capital needs 
are estimated at €59.3 billion 
under the adverse scenario
The capital needs are 
concentrated in seven of the 
fourteen banking groups 
considered, particularly in the 
banks in which the FROB has 
a majority holding
The capital needs detected by 
the stress test do not 
represent the final amount of 
the State aid which will arise 
from the process
Banks will be classified into 
various groups…
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Second, once banks have been assigned to each group, they will have to submit 
restructuring or orderly resolution plans which must, where applicable, take into account 
the requested State aid in accordance with the impact of the transfers to Sareb and of the 
loss-assumption exercises by hybrid and subordinated instrument holders. The timetables 
for submitting these plans differ for each of the aforementioned groups of banks.
i.  Group 1. Since these are banks in which the FROB already has a capital holding, 
the Spanish authorities and the European Commission have been working on 
the plans since the end of July 2012. Taking into account the results of the stress 
test, the plans will be sent to the European Commission for approval in November. 
On this basis the State aid will be granted. Transfer of impaired assets to Sareb 
will have been commenced by the end of the year. Also, voluntary or mandatory 
loss-assumption exercises will have to be carried out by the holders of hybrid 
capital instruments.
ii.  Group 2. The Spanish authorities and the European Commission will assess 
the viability of the banks in light of the results of the stress tests and the 
recapitalisation plans submitted. The viable banks that need State aid for 
recapitalisation3 will have to prepare a restructuring plan. Any banks 
considered non-viable and non-systemic will be subjected to orderly 
resolution in accordance with the resolution plan. The Spanish authorities will 
…after which banks will 
submit restructuring or orderly 
resolution plans
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2  For greater details of the current status of the Sareb, see http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/
infointeres/reestructuracion/
3  Or those whose resolution could not be carried out without seriously harmful effects to the banking system.
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which holders of hybrid capital instruments (preference 
shares and subordinated debt) may be obliged to assume a 
portion of the losses of an institution undergoing restructuring 
or resolution. The FROB may thus impose a specific 
conversion exercise if it considers that the first phase of the 
exercise, which is proposed by the institution and accepted 
voluntarily, is deemed insufficient. The regulations offer 
different possibilities as to what the exchange options may 
consist of.
4 Asset Management Company for Assets Arising from Bank 
Restructuring (Sareb). The regulations lay the foundations for 
the creation of this Company and empower the FROB to 
oblige institutions that receive public aid to transfer their 
troubled assets to the Company.
5  New mechanisms to safeguard retail investors are laid down. 
These include enhanced transparency in the marketing of 
instruments not covered by the DGF and sold to retail 
customers, discouraging the marketing of some of them 
(preference shares and other likewise complex instruments) 
among such retail customers. The regulations also increase 
the powers of the CNMV (Spanish National Securities Market 
Commission), especially in respect of complex products 
marketed to retail customers.
6  Amendment of the capital principal requirement that institutions 
must meet under RDL 2/2011. The current requirements of 8% 
or 10% become a single requirement of 9% that must be met 
by all institutions as from 1 January 2013, adopting the 
European Banking Authority’s definition of core capital.
7  Clear segregation of functions between the Banco de España 
and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness in 
respect of licensing and sanctioning credit institutions, 
entrusting to the Banco de España the tasks for which the 
Ministry was previously responsible.
8  With regard to remuneration, a new, lower ceiling is set for 
fixed remuneration from all sources of executive chairmen, 
managing directors and managers of institutions which, 
although the FROB does not have a majority holding in them, 
receive financial support from it. This ceiling falls from its 
current level of €600,000 to €500,000.
On 31 August 2012 the Government approved RDL 24/2012 on the 
restructuring and resolution of credit institutions, with immediate 
entry into force.1 It entails an exceptional strengthening of the 
mechanisms available to Spanish public authorities to strengthen 
and clean up the financial system, the ultimate objective being to 
safeguard the financial sector as a whole.
A summary description is given below of the types of measures 
the RDL includes.
1   A new, strengthened crisis-management framework. A full 
legal regime is set in place for the treatment of ailing credit 
institutions, which involves the early writing into Spanish law 
of some of the aspects included in the draft of the future 
European Crisis Resolution Directive.
 On the basis of the seriousness of the ailing credit institution’s 
situation and with a view to its effective restructuring and orderly 
resolution, if necessary, the following may be considered: 
preemptive measures (for slight difficulties, which are integrated 
into the ordinary supervisory phase and are directed by the 
Banco de España), restructuring measures (for temporary 
weaknesses able to be resolved through the contribution of 
public funds, including the instruments of the financial 
assistance, the transfer of impaired assets to an asset 
management company or any early intervention measure) and 
resolution measures (for non-viable institutions, the resolution of 
which will be carried out by selling the business, transferring 
assets and liabilities to a bridge bank, or to an asset management 
company; instruments that may receive public financial support).
2   New regulations governing the FROB, defining its competencies 
and significantly reinforcing its tools at all stages of crisis 
management, while clarifying its relationship to the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund (DGF), limiting the DGF to deposit guarantee 
functions and potentially supporting orderly resolution 
processes up to the limits of the amount covered in guaranteed 
deposits, so as to safeguard the depositors covered.
3  Sharing restructuring costs: management of hybrid 
instruments. The regulations establish the mechanism under 
BOX 3.1RDL 24/2012 ON THE RESTRUCTURING AND RESOLUTION OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
1  At the time of this FSR going to press, the draft legislation RDL 24/2012 
was before Parliament for amendments.
send to the European Commission in October the related restructuring or 
resolution plans. The process of approval of the plan may take until the end 
of December because the stress test results have to be included. The plans 
have to incorporate the steps necessary for transferring assets to the Asset 
Management Company and the voluntary or mandatory exercises for loss- 
assumption by hybrid instrument holders.
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iii.  Group 3. Banks with capital needs equal to or above 2% of risk-weighted 
assets form a sub-group within Group 3. As a precautionary measure, banks 
in this sub-group will be required to issue contingent convertible securities 
(COCOs) under the recapitalisation scheme to meet their capital needs by 
end December 2012 at the latest. The COCOs will be subscribed by the 
FROB using programme resources and will not be converted until 30 June 
2013 if the banks do not succeed in raising private capital. If by that date a 
bank has not obtained private capital, the COCOs will be converted fully or 
partly into ordinary shares and the bank will have to present a restructuring 
plan to support its request for State aid.
       The other sub-group within Group 3 is comprised of banks with capital needs 
below 2% of risk-weighted assets. For this second sub-group, the procedure 
is the same as in the forgoing case, except that they will not issue COCOs 
during the period of time (until 30 June 2013) in which they are seeking 
private capital under their recapitalisation plan.
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